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Abstract 
This article examines the eff ect of the Transnistrian area on Moldova-Russia relations.  David Lake’s 
concept of hierarchy will be used as the theoretical framework. The article examines why Russia’s 
mechanisms of infl uence should be seen as a refl ection of a hierarchical relationship between Russia 
and Moldova.  The article begins by explaining why this work has chosen a hierarchical framework and 
a brief introduction of Transnistria.  This is followed by two sections of analysis: security and economy. 
These two sections will also contain subsections on events that highlight the hierarchical nature of the 
Moldova-Russia relationship.  This article shows that Russia clearly has a hierarchical relationship with 
Moldova.  David Lake’s theory proves to be a useful tool in understanding Moldovan-Russian relations.
Keywords: Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Westphalian sovereignty, hierarchical sovereignty.
Introduction
This article will establish whether a hierarchical approach to international relations can adequately 
explain Moldova’s complex relationship with Russia. The focus will be on how Russia’s presence 
in the Transnistrian area aff ects Moldova’s behavior. Russia’s continual military presence in the 
Transnistrian region of Moldova has given Russia signifi cant leverage in supporting the Transnistrian 
regime. We will examine whether this refl ects a level of hierarchy in Moldovan-Russian relations. 
This will be done by looking at the indicators of a hierarchical relationship established by David Lake. 
These will be grouped into two broad categories: security and economy. In addition to the indicators 
mentioned by David Lake, there will be some additional indicators specifi c to Moldova that the paper 
will examine. From this we will be able to see how Russia’s mechanisms of infl uence refl ect the 
hierarchical relationship between Moldova and Russia. The article will start by expounding on the idea 
of hierarchical sovereignty and explaining its application in this work. After which there will be a brief 
introduction of Transnistria, followed by two sections of analysis: security and economy.  Some of the 
specifi c indicators that will be studied are the role of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria, as well as 
the role of Transnistria in Russia’s energy and economic policy towards Moldova.
Russia’s foreign policy in the former Soviet Union (FSU) carries consequences for the entire 
international community. The breakup of the Soviet Union has made it diffi  cult in many instances 
for everyone to be on the same page regarding sovereignty. Traditional concepts of sovereignty 
have extreme limitations in the post-Soviet space. The concept originally comes from the 1648 
Westphalian peace treaty, where feudal systems were transformed to states with borders, and was 
further established with the 1933 convention in Montevideo, Uruguay. This type of understanding 
of sovereignty has been defi ned as “an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is 
based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
structures” by Krasner (quoted in Lake 2003: 309).
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This concept has been hard to apply in the post-Soviet space. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
gave way to frozen confl icts and de facto independent states. It also left Russia with an interest in the 
region. The Black Sea Fleet was left in Ukraine and the space launch facilities were left in Kazakhstan. 
There were also some 25 million ethnic Russians not living in Russia (Smith 1999: 485). For Russia, the 
region has been called the Near Abroad, a sphere of infl uence, and a sphere of interest (Trenin 2009: 
5). Gaining a better understanding of the impact of Russia’s behavior towards other countries in the 
region could have lasting impacts for policy makers, academics, and countries alike. Moldova occupies 
a place between the East and West and is a key country to understanding these relations. This study 
will use David Lake’s concept of hierarchy to examine Moldova-Russia relations. It is expected that a 
hierarchical approach to international relations in the post-Soviet space will allow us to understand 
state relationships in ways that go beyond traditional concepts of sovereignty.
In his book Hierarchy in International Relations, David Lake establishes his theory that stems from 
the philosophical understandings of Thomas Hobbs and the social contract (Lake 2009: 18). Rather 
than looking at coercion, Lake establishes a concept of authority, which means “rightful or legitimate 
rule” (ibid: 17). Lake also explains that “In an authority relationship, individuals choose whether to 
comply with a ruler’s commands, but are bound by the right of the ruler to discipline or punish their 
noncompliance” (ibid.). This understanding of authority is not in a legal sense, but a relational sense 
(ibid: 28). While this concept is typically used within states, Lake takes the concept and applies it 
to the international level. Though there is a greater degree of authority in domestic relationships 
(ibid: 41), authority is a key in understanding international relations as well. Hierarchy is a variable 
that shows how much authority is in the relationship (ibid: 45). If a country is able to legitimately 
command another country in many actions, then hierarchy is high, if not it is low. This means that 
sovereignty is a “delegated bundle of rights and therefore divisible, modifi able, and elastic” (ibid: 
49). In the traditional legal aspect, sovereignty could not be divided. This application of authority in 
international relations potentially gives us a powerful new tool to understand the world around us.
With this being a fairly new approach, naturally, it has not been fully tested and applied yet. This 
is always a needed step in science to “displace one [fl awed] theory by a less fl awed theory” (ibid: xii). 
Much of David Lake’s previous work has been focused on the United States (Lake 1999), which explains 
why his recent book on hierarchy in international relations would also focus on the United States. 
This work will shift that focus to a diff erent part of the world to see how his theoretical assumptions 
transfer.  Lake also suggests a need for more study on “federal forms of supranational hierarchy” (ibid: 
179), as his work focused on the relationship of a dominant state and subordinate state(s) (ibid.). 
While this work does not look to analyze federal forms of hierarchy, it does take this theory and apply 
it to the unique situation in which Moldova fi nds itself.
In Moldova, there is a triangle relationship where both Moldova and Transnistria (the breakaway 
region of Moldova) have a subordinate relationship to Russia, who can be seen as trying to maintain a 
hierarchical relationship. Moldova is a perfect case to further examine a hierarchical understanding of 
international relations. Looking at Russia’s actions in Transnistria will give us a greater understanding 
of whether there is a hierarchical relationship between Moldova and Russia.  This is important for 
every country that makes up the post-Soviet space.  Moldova is unique because it represents a country 
in-between the EU and Russia. Culturally, linguistically and ethnically Moldova and Romania are 
‘extremely similar’ (Küchler 2008: 25). During the latter years of the Russian empire and during the 
Soviet times, there was a movement to turn Moldova into a Slavic people and nation (ibid.). This 
brought out the diff erenecs between Moldova and Romania, emphasising a certain Moldovanism, 
which was diff erent from Romanian. Moldova’s time as a member of the USSR has also caused many 
to have nostalgia for the USSR and to want close ties to Russia. The dominance of the Communist 
party in Moldova is evidence of that. Moldova has not been able to fully integrate with the EU or 
Russia, and it is now the poorest state in Europe (Mikko 2009: 12-13). The 2010 re-election of a pro-
European parliament has brought attention to Moldova’s potential and long-awaited integration with 
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Europe. This integration has been hampered by the frozen confl ict in Transnistria. This breakaway 
region gives Russia leverage that it does not have in many other states. This frozen confl ict is what 
makes Moldova a perfect place to study Russia’s infl uence on Moldova and the role hierarchy plays.
Transnistria is the breakaway region of Moldova, located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. 
In Transnistria, they refer to themselves as Pridnestrovskaya Modavskaya Respublika, or PMR for 
short (Küchler 2008: 32). A 2004 census showed the population to be 555,000, divided as 32 percent 
Moldovan, 30 percent Russian, and 29 percent Ukrainian (Danelsons 2008: 13). GDP per capita is 
slightly lower in Transnistria than Moldova, though very comparable (Popescu 2005: 22).  Transnistria 
benefi ts from industrialization and support from Russia, but is hurt by international isolation. The 
region was traditionally part of Ukraine until it was merged with Bessarabia in 1940. During its time 
in the Soviet Union, it was the more industrialized part of Moldova, while Moldova proper (Moldova 
excluding the Transnistrian area) continued to develop its agriculture sector. An infl ux of Russian 
immigrants accompanied the industrialization, which is the reason for the diff erences in ethnicities 
between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova (Herd 2005: 2).
Transnistrian elites and politicians also played the more dominant role in Soviet politics (Küchler 
2008: 49). It is not a surprise that Transnistria wanted independence when the idea of Moldova’s 
reunifi cation with Romania circled in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Shoemaker 2006: 165).  In the 
early 1990s, the dispute between Transnistria and Moldova broke out into a small war when the 
Government of Moldova tried to retake control of the area. The Russian military played a role in 
helping Transnistria fi ght off  Moldovan troops. The military base located in Transnistria continues 
to operate and is the location of arms and ammunition as well as peacekeeping troops.  This region, 
which enjoys de facto independence and gets substantial support from Russia, will be the key in 
establishing whether and to what degree of a hierarchical relationship Moldova has with Russia.  The 
fi rst section of analysis will focus on security.
Security
Lake uses security and economics as the main fi elds where hierarchy can be established. According to 
Lake, “security policy includes all diplomatic, military, and even economic actions available to a state 
to lower the risk and eff ectiveness of coercion from other external actors” (Lake 2009: 52).  The specifi c 
indicators Lake uses to operationalize his theory of hierarchy in security policy are fi rst, the presence 
of military forces and, second, the number of independent alliances possessed by the potentially 
subordinate state (ibid: 69). This operationalization allows Lake to measure the amount of hierarchy 
between two states. We need to remember that Lake’s operationalization of his theory was specifi c 
to the US (ibid.). Consequently, this section will also analyze Russia’s role in Moldovan elections. 
The electoral success of the Moldovan Communist party begs to have their relationship with Russia 
examined.  If Russia has infl uenced the elections to the extent that it determines the outcome, then 
this could be an indicator that coercion not authority is the main element of Moldovan-Russian 
relations.  According to the theory of hierarchy, authority is legitimate and it is diff erent from pure 
coercion.  This analysis of Russia’s role in Moldova’s elections falls under the diplomatic category that 
Lake recognizes as part of a country’s security policy.  The fi rst indicator to be analyzed is the presence 
of military forces.
As stated in the introduction, the Russian military played a role in Transnistria gaining its de 
facto independence from Moldova. Elements of Russia’s 14th army actively supported the Transnistrian 
separatists. Moldova was unsuccessful in attempting to retake the region. (Nygren 2008: 83) The 
war killed anywhere from 500 (Waters 1998: 1) to 1,500 people (Popescu 2005: 15). There are still 
questions about the role of Russia’s 14th army in the confl ict. The army was made up of many locals 
from Transnistria (Nygren 2008: 83), and according to some sources only ‘some elements of the 14th 
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army’(Shoemaker 2006: 165) supported the separatist movement. The Russian military has maintained 
its presence in Transnistria ever since. The number of Russian troops located in Transnistria has 
decreased since the early nineties (ibid.) and currently numbers 1,500 (Quinlan 2008: 133).  There are 
also large amounts of Russian armaments stored in Transnistria; estimates are in the range of 20,000 
to 25,000 tons, depending on the source (Popescu 2005: 19; Quinlan 2008: 133). This represents about 
half the size of armaments as there were initially. Heavy military equipment has also been removed or 
destroyed, including over 100 T-64 battle tanks (Flikke & Godzimirski 2006: 39).
This has been a troublesome issue for Moldova, and Moldova sees this as a violation of their 
sovereignty and constitution. Their constitution declared Moldova a neutral state saying, “The Republic 
of Moldova declares its permanent neutrality and does not admit the stationing of foreign military 
units on its territory” (Waters 1998: 2). Moldova has always been opposed to Russian troops being 
indefi nitely stationed in Moldova. Russia, on the other hand, has always been reluctant to remove the 
troops. In 1999, there was an OSCE summit in Istanbul, where Russia agreed to withdraw troops and 
armaments from Transnistria by 2002 (Tugui 2011: 3). Russia then suspended the Conventional Forces 
in Europe Treaty (CFE), which in their eyes removed the legal obligation to remove the troops.
When looking at hierarchical relationships, one important aspect is that the subordinate country 
has to be willing to accept the authority. There are certain benefi ts that the subordinate receives, such 
as order and security (Lake 2009: 138). At fi rst glance, it would appear that this is not a hierarchical 
relationship but rather a simple relationship of coercion. Despite the Moldovan constitution and 
political rhetoric, we can see a diff erent picture where authority and hierarchy are very much at play. 
Moldova’s army consisted of some 11,000 troops as of 1998 (Waters 1998: 5), and currently has 
around 7,000 troops (Popescu 2005: 19). This is a very small number even for a state the size of 
Moldova. Moldova has seen signifi cant reductions in its armed forces since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. These reductions include the selling of MiG-29 fi ghters, which were replaced by helicopters. 
The selling of MIG-29 fi ghters was only a natural move for a poor country with an extremely small air 
space, although it does highlight the cost cutting measures in Moldova’s military reform.  Moldova 
also adopted a military doctrine in 1995, which states that Moldova is a de-militarized nation. (Waters 
1998: 3-5) As of 2005, Moldova spent just 0.4 percent of their GDP on defense (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2011), roughly one tenth of what the US spends. This is a perfect example of the benefi t that a 
subordinate country receives from a hierarchical relationship. Moldova does not have to worry about 
a hot war with Transnistria; it also is able to keep its defense spending at only 0.4 percent of the GDP. 
In this sense, it pays to have Russia provide order and stability.  Members of NATO are required to 
spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, while having to actively participate in hot spots around the 
world. While this analogy only goes so far because Moldova is not in an offi  cial military alliance with 
Russia, it brings out the point that Moldova faces few military security problems. If Moldova were to 
see Russia as a threat to order, one could at least expect higher military expenditures.
Through all the years of negotiations, the closest anyone came to solving the frozen confl ict was 
the 2003 Kozak memorandum. This was a Russian sponsored plan that was ultimately rejected.  Some 
of the basic elements of the proposal were the stationing of Russian troops for an additional 20 
years and an asymmetrical federation. The federation plan would give Transnistria a disproportional 
amount of power, which would enable it to veto all federal laws until 2015 (Quinlan 2008: 130). Only in 
2020 would a proportionately elected legislative body be created that would satisfy Moldova’s vision 
of a unifi ed federation (Löwenhardt 2004: 109). Vladimir Voronin, the president of Moldova at the 
time, backed out of the previously agreed proposal at the last minute. Voronin was under domestic 
and foreign pressure to not accept the proposal. The foreign pressure to reject the memorandum 
was especially fi erce as the OSCE, the EU and the US Ambassador to Moldova all fl at out rejected the 
agreement. (Quinlan 2008: 131)  Voronin later said that the reason he did not accept the proposal was 
because of the clause that allowed the Russian military to be stationed in Moldova for so long (Nygren 
2008: 261). Given the fact that Voronin initialed the agreement previously, it is plausible that without 
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the fi erce international opposition an agreement would have been reached. This would have shown 
that Moldova does benefi t from the order that Russia provides and was willing to accept Russia’s 
authority.
Recently Russia has off ered Moldova cheaper natural gas in return for a long-term lease for the 
military base in Transnistria (Socor 2011). The specifi cs of the deal have not been made known, but this 
type of deal would legally be unconstitutional and has not been taken seriously by Moldova.  Russia 
has stated that it will not withdraw the troops before a solution to the confl ict can be established 
(Küchler 2008: 66). A solution to the confl ict has proven diffi  cult, and Russia holds a lot of leverage 
because of the support they have from the Transnistrian regime. It is clear that the Transnistrian 
regime is dependent on Russia for order and support. In the Kozack memorandum debates, Igor 
Smirnov, the president of Transnistria, wanted to keep Russian troops in Transnistria for 30 years, 
not the 20 that Russia proposed (Flikke & Godzimirski 2006: 53). The Russian peacekeepers stationed 
in Transnistria have also had an eff ect in strengthening the Transnistrian army. One other important 
issue coming from Transnistria is the illegal sale of weapons. Some of the weapons that have been 
sold include: Grad rockets, Igla air-to-surface rockets and Vasilyok mortars. Some of the buyers have 
been from Chechnya and Abkhazia (Herd 2005: 6). In addition to possible black market trade, these 
weapons have supplied, equipped and supported the Transnistrian military as well (Küchler 2008: 44). 
Many former Russian military personel who have ties to Transnistria now serve in the Transnistrian 
military, while some serving in the Russian military consider Transnistria their home and would never 
consider leaving (ibid: 66).
Having foreign troops stationed in a country is nothing out of the ordinary; Russia has troops in 
other countries, as does the United States. However, what is of note here is that having foreign troops 
stationed in Moldova is against the Moldovan constitution and is against the publicly stated will of 
the government. It should be noted here that in 2001 President Voronin signed a pact with Russia 
making “Russia the guarantor of Moldova’s territorial integrity” (Küchler 2008: 61). This is perhaps 
the best indicator of the hierarchical relationship between Moldova and Russia. While Moldova has 
not made such bold statements advocating subordination since then, they have not acted in any 
measure to reject this hierarchical relationship. Another aspect to be noted here about the troops 
is regarding their role as peacekeepers. Offi  cially the troops are there as peacekeepers, but in reality 
their duties refl ect more those of border guards (Popescu 2005: 20). But even the role of border guards 
is important; this maintains order, which is a benefi t for Moldova.
The second indicator in this section is the number of independent alliances possessed by the 
subordinate state (Lake 2009: 69). This indicator is problematic for a single case study like Moldova. 
Moldova is a declared neutral country (Waters 1998: 2), and there are no military alliances to analyze. 
To some extent, this means that the relationship is even more hierarchical because there is no other 
source for Moldova’s security, however, it would be too simplistic to leave the analysis at that.  This 
section will instead analyze the relationship that Moldova has with NATO, the other competing 
military alliance.  If Moldova were interested in joining NATO, it would mean a decrease in the level of 
hierarchy.  If Moldova had no desire to join NATO, then that would be a sign that Moldova has agreed 
in some form to the subordinate role in a hierarchical relationship with Russia.
In 2005, Vladimir Socor pointed out the link between Moldova’s behavior towards Western 
organizations and Moscow’s unwillingness to withdraw its troops from Transnistria (Socor 2005). 
There have been two agreements to withdraw the troops – in 1994 and in 1999 (Küchler 2008: 60, 61). 
Moscow obviously felt confi dent in Moldova’s future as a neutral country, thus, not upsetting the 
balance of hierarchy in the relationship. But when Moldova started showing an increased interest 
towards NATO, the EU and to some extent the OSCE, Russia decided to keep the troops in Transnistria 
(Socor 2005). According to Socor, this was not just an analysis of positions taken by Moscow, but an 
actual statement from the Russian foreign ministry (ibid.). The most important issue at hand was 
Moldova’s request in 2005 for NATO to grant it an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), (ibid.). 
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While the EU and the OSCE are important, only Moldova’s relationship with NATO will be examined 
here.  The IPAP was signed in 2006, while President Voronin visited NATO headquarters in both 2006 
and 2007 (NATO 2009). In 2009, Prime Minister Vlad Filat reiterated that Moldova was not interested 
in joining NATO (Moldova.org 2009). Prime Minister Filat also repeated this stance in 2011 (Filat 2011). 
The levels of NATO-Moldova cooperation are still noteworthy.
Within the security realm, NATO has noted that Moldova has brought portions of its armed forces 
closer to full interoperability with Allied forces (NATO 2009). NATO also maintains the position that 
Russian forces should be removed from Transnistria (ibid.). The most striking commentary on NATO-
Moldovan relations is that “NATO and individual Allies continue to assist Moldova in creating modern, 
mobile, high-readiness, well-equipped and cost-eff ective forces that are interoperable with those of 
the Allies” (ibid.). It was in response to this that Moscow ‘punished’ Moldova in the words of Vladimir 
Socor (2005). In a hierarchical relationship, the dominating state has the legitimacy to punish or 
discipline the subordinate state (Lake 2009: 112-113). This appears to be a case of just that.  Had Moldova 
wanted to completely end the hierarchical relationship with Russia, it would have made plans to join 
NATO or made other confrontational moves. Instead, what we see is Moldova backing off  cooperation 
with NATO. The limit of Moldovan-NATO cooperation was made clear when Prime Minister Filat said 
that Moldova would never join NATO. In addition to a lack of public support for such a move, Moldova 
would also have to amend its constitution. Furthermore, it is doubtful that NATO would be ready to 
accept Moldova as a member state as long as the frozen confl ict with Transnistria continues.
The third indicator in the security section is Russia’s support for the Communist party in elections. 
If Moldova’s ruling party were to be in power due to Russian support, then Moldova-Russia relations 
could not be considered a consensual hierarchical relationship. The Moldovan Communist party has 
a strong connection to Russia, especially compared to the other major parties in Moldova, which has 
led to Russian support. The Communist party came to power after the 2001 Moldovan parliamentary 
elections, which was the fi rst time a Communist party came to power since the end of the Cold War 
(Hill 2001: 130). The elections saw the Communists win a clear majority with over 50 percent of the 
vote. Newly elected President Voronin noted that Moldova’s foreign policy would “undergo some 
modifi cations” (Shoemaker 2006: 168), meaning a gravitation towards Russia. Just over a month after 
Voronin was elected, a Russian-Moldovan friendship treaty was signed, which stipulated “Russia as 
the guarantor of Moldova’s territorial integrity” (Küchler 2008: 61).
The election in 2005 again kept the Communists in power. This time they received 46 percent 
of the vote, about 5 percent less than in the 2001 elections and 56 seats in the parliament, 15 less 
than in the 2001 elections (Shoemaker 2006: 170). Before the 2009 elections, the Kremlin was openly 
backing Voronin’s Communist party. The Kremlin was even off ering Moldova a loan up to 500 million 
USD the month before the July 2009 elections (O’Neil 2009). This was seen as an attempt to boost 
the Communist party’s results. This, however, was not enough to convince the voters that a Russian 
oriented foreign policy was what Moldova needed. The elections in 2009 brought in a pro-European 
power. Political gridlock caused elections to be held in 2010 as well. Before the elections, Russia 
demanded the repayment of a 288 million USD natural gas debt. Most of this debt was Transnistria’s, 
but Gazprom was asking Chisinau to pay the bill. Local politicians argue that Russia was making this 
claim to try to help the Communist party get elected again in the 2010 elections (Eftode 2010). Despite 
this, the pro-European power was elected to power again.
What is interesting to note with Moldovan elections is that the Communist party has not always 
had positive relations with Russia. From 2003 to 2006, relations between the Communist party and 
Russia were not good, stemming from the rejection of the 2003 Kozak memorandum. This means 
that the Communist success in 2005 cannot be attributed to help from Russia, because Russia did 
not support the Communist party at that time. The time when Russia did attempt to infl uence the 
elections appeared to be in 2009, when they off ered a large loan, which many assumed to be directly 
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tied to the outcome of the election. As noted earlier, this was not enough to change the results of 
the elections. There is no evidence that Russia has had any success in signifi cantly altering Moldovan 
elections. 
It appears that Russia has not in any way signifi cantly altered the government of Moldova, which 
again leads us to believe that there is a true hierarchical relationship between the two. The analysis of 
Russia’s troop presence in the Transnistria region and Moldova’s relationship with NATO also highlight 
the presence of a hierarchical relationship. This leads us to believe that the infl uences Russia wields 
in Moldova are legitimate and Moldova is accepting of this relationship. According to the indicators, 
the relationship is signifi cantly hierarchical given Moldova’s lack of alliances and the role of Russia’s 
troops in the Transnistria area. The next section will evaluate economic relations to see if they produce 
the same results.
Economy
Like security policy, economic policy is also a broad topic. “It includes all actions that aff ect the 
accumulation and allocations of resources” (Lake 2009: 56). In an attempt to measure the level 
of hierarchy in economic relationships, Lake gives us two indicators: a country’s monetary policy 
autonomy and trade dependence (ibid: 71,74). Within trade relations, this article will focus on both 
exports and imports. The section on exports will focus on Russia’s wine and food boycotts. This will 
enable us to understand the infl uence that Russia has as an importer of Moldovan goods. The section 
on imports will focus on Moldova’s energy dependency. Energy security is an important topic for many 
of Russia’s neighbors, and given Moldova’s dependency on Russia for natural gas, it demands specifi c 
attention. A third indicator will also be analyzed that is specifi c to Moldova’s situation. As noted, the 
indicators given by Lake are specifi cally used to operationalize US relations with others. The addition 
of this third indicator will allow us to further the in-depth study of the hierarchical relationship 
between Moldova and Russia. This indicator is Moldova’s stated goal of joining the EU and integrating 
with Europe. EU membership would certainly result in a decrease in Russian authority in Moldovan 
economic policies, which makes this indicator important to study.
The fi rst indicator is monetary policy. This is important to Lake because it is the key to a country’s 
prices regarding other states (ibid: 72). According to Lake, there are diff erent levels of hierarchy 
concerning monetary policy. At the highest hierarchical level, a subordinate state adopts the currency 
of the dominant state. This is followed by a hard peg, where the currency is diff erent but the exchange 
rate is linked or pegged to the dominant state’s currency. The third level is a loose or crawling peg, 
where the currency of a subordinate state is partially linked to the currency of a dominant state, and 
last is a fl oating exchange rate. (Ibid.)
Moldova maintains a fl oating exchange rate, which suggests a low level of hierarchy.  The 
National Bank of Moldova also has stated that despite the fl oating exchange rate, it reserves the 
right to “intervene on the foreign exchange market to smooth out the excessive fl uctuations of the 
offi  cial exchange rate and to supplement the international foreign exchange reserves” (National 
Bank of Moldova 2010: 6). This means that Moldova has control over its own monetary policy with 
minimal infl uence from Russia. The National Bank of Moldova has stated that its aim is to maintain 
price stability and low infl ation (ibid: 3), while closely working with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (ibid: 9). In evaluating Moldova’s monetary policy, there is surprisingly little evidence of Russian 
authority. This means that the level of hierarchy is very low in this sector. This is contrary to what we 
have found in the security policy section.
The second indicator that Lake uses to operationalize his theory is trade dependence (Lake 
2009: 74). According to Lake, “if a state has many trade partners, it is likely to have greater political 
autonomy and any attempt to manipulate trade for political purposes will be ineff ective” (ibid.).  As a 
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whole, Moldova is not completely dependent on Russia for trade. This is in large part because Moldova 
does not border Russia. According to the CIA fact book, Moldova’s top three export recipient states are 
Russia (23.8 percent), Italy (13 percent) and Romania (10.9 percent) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). 
In terms of exports, Russia is by far the most important country for Moldova.
One of the most important exports for the Moldovan economy is wine, so the Russian boycotts 
on Moldovan wine will be examined next. This will help us establish the amount of infl uence Russia 
was able to exert on Moldova.  This started in 2005 when Moldovan-Russian relations were not good. 
Moldova expelled 11 Russian election observers for “interfering in the election campaign and spreading 
disinformation” (Shoemaker 2006: 171). In April, Russia responded with boycotts – fi rst on meat 
products, then on fruits, vegetables and wine (Quinlan 2008: 140). The main economic impact was 
the boycott on Moldovan wine. Wine exports to Russia made up 30 percent of total export revenue in 
2005 (Quinlan 2008: 146). At the time of the boycott, Moldova exported 85 percent of their total wine 
production and 90 percent of exports went to Russia (Aden 2010). The offi  cial reason for the bans was 
due to a lack of quality control (Nygren 2008: 98). Even though many of the Moldovan wineries were 
Russian-owned, Russia held fi rm to the boycott for some time. The boycotts were lifted in stages after 
relations began to improve. In early 2007, the boycotts on meat and fruits and vegetables were lifted, 
the wine boycott later in 2007. The Russian-owned wineries were able to start exporting before the 
Moldovan-owned wineries. (Quinlan 2008: 151) The rise in energy prices (to be discussed next) and the 
boycott on wine had a signifi cant impact on the economy. In 2004 and 2005, real GDP growth was 7.4 
and 7.5 percent, in 2006 it dropped to 4.8 percent, and in 2007 it dropped to 3.0 percent. Growth in 
2008 was back up to 7.8 percent (Global Finance 2010).
Russia’s boycotts certainly were implemented for political purposes. After the rejection of the 2003 
Kozak memorandum, relations were poor. The economic boycotts were a continuation of this poor 
relationship. The overall eff ect of these boycotts caused a signifi cant impact on Moldova’s economy. 
Just before the end of the boycotts, the Voronin government became friendlier towards the Russian 
government. Voronin traveled to Moscow in August of 2006 for a closed door meeting with President 
Putin. Vladimir Socor stated that the economic pressure by Russia gave Voronin no choice but to 
seek reconciliation (Socor 2006). In 2007, the year the boycotts were lifted, Voronin visited Russia 
three times (Quinlan 2008: 148-152). Moldova also came out in support of Russia’s WTO bid (ibid.), 
which seems incredible given the political nature of the wine boycotts. The reconciliation by Moldova 
refl ects the legitimacy that Russia holds as the dominant state in this hierarchical relationship.  The 
next section will look at Moldovan imports.
Regarding imports, Moldova imports the most from Ukraine (16.3 percent), Russia (11 percent) and 
Germany (8.6 percent) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). This represents a more balanced relationship 
than what we saw in exports. What is interesting to note here is not the simple 11 percent that Moldova 
imports from Russia, but rather what it is importing. The most important aspect of Moldovan imports 
is energy, specifi cally natural gas. We have seen this as a key issue with other countries in the area as 
well. Here the role of Transnistria again comes into play.
Without Russia’s support Transnistria would not be a viable political entity. The continued frozen 
confl ict prevents the Moldovan government from governing in the Transnistrian area, which has 
enabled smuggling of illegal goods. Some have gone so far as to call Transnistria a black hole (Herd 
2005: 6). The black market of the region is estimated to be 250 million dollars annually, based on a 2005 
estimate (Michael & Polner 2008, 527). These fi gures do not show up in offi  cial trade statistics, but 
certainly have an impact on Moldova. The frozen confl ict also hampers potential EU accession plans 
and causes energy problems for Moldova. One of the most important issues at hand is energy.  Energy 
is one of the main ways that Russia supports the Transnistrian regime.  It is also a potential way to put 
pressure on Moldova. Many have talked about the natural gas cuts to Ukraine and Belarus, but cuts 
have happened to Moldova as well. For Moldova, natural gas means electricity.  Large electrical plants 
convert natural gas from Russia into electricity for domestic consumption. Gas disputes in the nineties 
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were fairly common. When Gazprom cut the gas to Moldova in the nineties, rotating blackouts took 
place.  The primary reason for the gas disputes was Moldova’s failure to pay, as there was a culture of 
nonpayment in Moldova at the time. Moldova also failed to pay energy bills to Romania and Ukraine, 
who in turn also cut power supplies to Moldova in 1999 (Quinlan 2002: 92).
There were more signifi cant gas disputes after Moldovan-Russian relations deteriorated due to 
the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum. In March 2005, Russia informed Moldova that their days of 
subsidized gas were over. The current price of $80 per 1,000 cubic meters was well below market value 
and Russia did not see the need to subsidize Moldovan energy anymore. Gazprom’s intention was to 
double the price to $160 per 1,000 cubic meters. Russia also used this opportunity to demand shares 
of Moldovagaz as part of the deal. (Nygren 2008: 97) In 2006, Moldova was paying the highest price in 
the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) (Quinlan 2008: 147). Also in 2006, Russia turned off  
the gas for a short period of time. It wasn’t until relations had improved that a long-term gas deal was 
fi nalized in 2007. (Nygren 2008: 97)
When looking at the gas situation between Moldova and Russia, there are three important aspects. 
One is the fact that Russia has the right to charge a market rate. This is also refl ective of the right 
Russia has at enforcing the authority in the relationship.  As Lake notes, being a dominant state comes 
at a cost (Lake 2009: 93). To produce order, the dominant state needs to pay the security costs, and 
evidently in this situation Russia was losing money in potential gas revenues as well. By raising the 
price of gas, Russia was reminding Moldova of its legitimacy and the cost Russia had been paying to 
be the dominant state.
The second aspect is Russia’s purchase of shares of Moldovagaz. This refl ects Russia’s longstanding 
goals of controlling energy exports to Europe and avoiding transit states. Whether ownership of 
Moldovagaz represents coercion or was part of a legitimate hierarchical relationship depends on how 
the ownership was acquired. In the case of Russia, taking ownership of Moldovagaz is not a sign of 
coercion as long as Russia obtained the ownership in a legal and normal manner, which was agreed 
upon by Moldova. Most likely Moldova’s poverty is the biggest reason why Moldova sold shares of 
Moldovagaz.  Moldova is a poor country and could not aff ord to pay market price for the gas, so it was 
able to get a cheaper deal by off ering shares of Moldovagaz.
The third aspect is the Transnistria issue.  Transnistria consumes a very high amount of Russian 
gas. There is lots of Russian-owned industry and power plants that turn the gas into electricity. 
Transnistria has not paid this debt, and Russia has not tried to collect from Transnistria.  Russia has an 
overall gas debt for all of Moldova. By not collecting the debt from Transnistria, Russia has supported 
the Transnistrian regime. Recently the situation has changed.  Moldova and Russia have fi nally come 
to an agreement that separates the Moldovan and Transnistrian gas bills.  Transnistria will take over 
the 2.5 billion USD debt and will receive legal recognition of their stake in Moldovagaz.  (OSW 2011) 
Since Moldova did not have a controlling stake in Moldovagaz anyway, they will not be losing much 
by this deal. The gas was consumed by Russian-owned companies in Transnistria, which are outside 
the control of Chisinau. The division of debt brings an interesting aspect to the Transnistria-Moldova-
Russia triangle. Transnistria is now more dependent on Russia as they are now legally responsible 
for the debt. Moldova also has in some ways recognized the Transnistrian regime’s legitimacy by 
recognizing their share in Moldovagaz.
The third indicator is Moldova’s stated goal to join the European Union.  By joining the European 
Union, Moldova would be giving up a portion of its decision-making powers to Brussels.  This clearly 
would result in a decrease in hierarchy in Moldova’s relationship with Russia in economic policy. 
Currently there is no signifi cant defense or military aspect in the EU-Moldova relations, making the 
biggest infl uence of the EU felt in economic policy.  In a public lecture organized by the Estonian 
Foreign Policy Institute, Prime Minister Vladimir Filat stated that Moldova has a clear goal of joining 
the European Union, and that the current debt problems in the Euro zone have neither created panic, 
nor deterred Moldova’s determination to join (Filat 2011).
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It appears that there could be a potential rivalry brewing for hierarchy. Russia has come out with 
plans to turn the current Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan into a Eurasian 
union (Popova 2011). Given Russia’s willingness to demonstrate its authority over Moldova in economic 
policy in the past, it is logical to assume that it will happen in the future as well.  After Prime Minister 
Filat’s speech at the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, the author asked the Prime Minister whether 
Russia had applied any offi  cial or unoffi  cial pressure on Moldova to join the Customs Union.  Vladimir 
Filat responded that there has been no pressure or invitation (Filat 2011).  Prime Minister Filat rejected 
the idea of joining a future Eurasian Union (ibid.). One of the primary reasons for not joining the 
Customs Union in the future is because it would contradict plans to join the EU. According to Prime 
Minister Filat, Moldova’s European course is irreversible (ibid.). These statements came just days after 
Moldova had signed a free trade agreement with Russia and other states from the (CIS) (BBC News 
2011). Prime Minister Filat also mentioned that the free trade agreement was in compliance with the 
WTO and did not contradict EU cooperation (Filat 2011). This is an interesting relationship that is still 
developing. The analysis on this third indicator, thus, does not give us concrete results, but it does 
let us know what to look for in the future. Will Moldova be able to integrate into the EU? Will Russia 
apply pressure on Moldova to join the Customs Union or a future Eurasian Union? Only time will tell.
When looking at economic policies, we can see the same patterns we did in security policies. We 
saw surprisingly little evidence of Russian authority in Moldovan monetary policy. Thus, this indicator 
would suggest that level of hierarchy in Moldovan-Russian relations is not high. This could be perhaps 
due to the inability of Russia to eff ectively infl uence another country’s currency. The Ruble is not 
yet a global reserve currency and Russia is only beginning to establish its authority in the realm of 
economics. This is evident in the current customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as the 
recently proposed Eurasian Union (Popova 2011). The other indicators, however, painted a diff erent 
picture. Moldova is heavily reliant on Russia as an export market. This was evident when Russia 
boycotted Moldovan wine. The boycott resulted in changed behavior from Moldova, which suggests 
a high level of hierarchy in Moldova-Russia relations. The analysis of imports leads us to the same 
conclusion. An increase in natural gas prices also contributed to the change in Moldovan behavior 
when then president Voronin attempted to seek reconciliation with Russia. The third indicator 
brought out Moldova’s desire to join the EU and their rejection of membership in a Customs Union 
or a Eurasian Union. It also saw them joining a free trade zone with Russia. If the current level of 
hierarchy continues between Moldova and Russia, we can expect Russia to exert its authority on 
Moldova to join the Customs Union or the Eurasian Union.
Conclusions
This article set out to explore the complex case of Moldovan sovereignty. The classical Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty was insuffi  cient in understanding this case due to the breakaway region 
of Transnistria, coupled with Russia’s support of the regime. David Lake’s theory of hierarchy in 
international relations enabled us to better understand the issues at hand.  In applying this theoretical 
framework, we looked at security and economic policies using the four indicators that Lake used in 
his work on hierarchy in US relationships.  In addition to the four indicators Lake used, this work also 
included two additional indicators specifi c for the Moldova case.
In analyzing these six indicators in both security and economic policies, we can conclude that 
a hierarchical framework is suffi  cient in explaining Moldova’s sovereignty, with regards to Russia 
and Russia’s support for the Transnistrian regime. Lake’s concept of legitimate authority was present 
in both the security and economic policies. This was most evident in the analysis of imports and 
exports.  The wine boycotts, gas dependency and the way Moldova reacted in those situations clearly 
Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian Eff ect 13
demonstrated legitimate authority, as defi ned by Lake. Though this work did not operationalize the 
variables quantitatively, the qualitative analysis of the indicators shows a high level of hierarchy in 
Moldova’s relationship with Russia. This article also highlighted signifi cant events in the future that 
will also have an eff ect on this analysis as they unfold; chiefl y, whether Russia will pressure Moldova 
to enter the Customs Union or Eurasian Union. While Moldova currently rejects this prospect, it is 
possible in a hierarchical relationship that Russia will use its legitimate authority to convince Moldova 
to join.
This study as a whole confi rms the validity of Lake’s theory, while demonstrating its utility in a 
complex case of sovereignty. The role of de facto states, in this case, is not an area that needs to be 
overlooked because of its complexness. With a hierarchical understanding of sovereignty, de facto 
states can be understood and explained as well. While this explanation of hierarchical sovereignty may 
not be accepted by Moldovan offi  cials, it should be applauded in the IR discipline. This theory appears 
to have the validity and utility to increase our understanding of sovereignty signifi cantly.
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